Hybrid CoE Working Paper 14: Migration instrumentalization: A taxonomy for an efficient response

Migration instrumentalization (MI) ranks as a low-cost strategy for perpetrators, as migrants can be exploited by countries that have few other strategic advantages. Hence, the EU must ask itself how it can raise the costs for its antagonists. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper proposes a taxonomy of MI events to help identify patterns in the way that migration is being instrumentalized. Then, the taxonomy is tested against four recent MI campaigns, and in a third step, the question of how the EU could use such a taxonomy is analyzed.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 13: The Kremlin’s messaging on Ukraine: Authorities and “media” hand in hand

The Russian military build-up along the Ukrainian borders is being accompanied by an information offensive. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper analyzes that offensive and its evolution in the second half of 2021. The paper looks at public statements by high-level representatives of the Russian government, considers whether there is an increase in Russian information activities targeting Ukraine, and analyzes the narratives of these information activities. According to the analysis, the messaging of the highest Kremlin representatives and of the Russian “media” seems to run in unison and there seems to be some level of organization in the current communication campaign.  

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 12: Calibrating the compass: Hybrid threats and the EU’s Strategic Compass

The EU’s Strategic Compass, to be finalized in 2022, should clarify the EU’s assessment of the security environment, define the level of ambition in security and defence, and offer tools to achieve that level of ambition. As the threat picture is more complex than before, a new approach is needed. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper explicates such an approach by looking at the development of the EU’s security and defence dimension and analyzing the threat environment and the concept of hybrid threats; introducing the concept of deterrence in the EU strategies; and looking at ways of improving the EU’s responses. 

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 11: Disinformation 2.0: Trends for 2021 and beyond

Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election drew attention to the ways that social media can be leveraged for information operations by nation-state actors. Since then, however, these campaigns have evolved. Using the 2020 election in the United States as a case study, this Hybrid CoE Working Paper evaluates how the actors, strategies, and tactics for spreading disinformation have evolved from 2016 to 2020, and discusses the direction that future policymaking should take to address contemporary trends in information operations.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 10: Drones in hybrid warfare: Lessons from current battlefields

The security environment has changed drastically in recent decades, affecting the way in which violent conflicts are conducted. In addition to military means, conflicts are supplemented with means from other domains. This may result in multidomain hybrid attacks and reflects the new reality of war and conflict management in the 21st century. Due to the multidimensionality of hybrid conflicts, drones represent a means of choice for hybrid actors. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper examines the use of drones in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and highlights trends from the perspective of hybrid methods.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 9: Strengthening the resilience and adaptive capacity of societies at risk from hybrid threats

How would the civilian population of a specific country respond to significant disruptions caused by hybrid threats? This paper explores different response scenarios and considers what can be done to strengthen the resilience and adaptive capacities of a civilian population, and its social institutions, when such threats are likely. One of the main challenges in increasing civilian resilience is the uncertainty and unpredictability of both the threat and how people will respond to it. The paper recommends utilizing an adaptive approach that is designed to cope with the complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 8: Hybrid threats in the financial system

The financial system, given its centrality to day-to-day economic transactions, is an attractive target for adversarial action. Like hybrid threats in general, hybrid threats emerging in the financial domain are always aimed at exerting a strategic impact. The importance of the financial system as a link between different sectors in society makes it an enabler of hybrid threats, which potentionally can have cascading effects on non-economic domains of the target country/region.

Due to the financial, monetary, and single market interdependencies undermining the financial systems credibility, or otherwise disrupting its operations, can create havoc in an EU member state and in the EU generally. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper bases on the main findings from the workshop “Hybrid threats in the financial system” organised by Hybrid CoE CoI Vulnerabilities and Resilience (CoI VR) in close cooperation with Bruegel, an European think tank that specializes in economics. The workshop examined hybrid threats in the context of the financial system by assessing vulnerabilities and solutions for effective protective measures and improved resilience. This working paper aims to shed light on how the financial system can be used as an enabler or target of disturbance.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 7: Quantum Sciences – Disruptive Innovation in Hybrid Warfare

Quantum technologies will lead to enormously improved computingcommunicationcryptographynavigation, and sensing capabilities that will enable hybrid actors to push the envelope of hybrid aggression”, argues Ralph Thiele.

Technological trends suggest that the portfolio of hybrid hazards will rapidly expand. With their disruptive potential, they open up new avenues for violence, as well as for the use of force in a hybrid warfare/conflict environment. New technologies have a catalytic effect on hybrid methods and tools. They improve the starting conditions for hybrid action, expand the arsenal of hybrid players and thus help to increase the reach of their activities as well as their prospects of success. Today, new technologies provide a way to achieve political goals in the grey area of various interfaces, such as between war and peace.

With this in mind, the Hybrid CoE and its Community of Interest for Strategy and Defence (COI S&D) have initiated the Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies (HYFUTEC) project, aimed at assessing and enhancing understanding of the disruptive potential of new technologies in the context of hybrid warfare/conflict. Within its broad future & technology horizon scanning, the project has identified 19 technological trends with urgent and profound implications in the context of hybrid scenarios.

In order to provide insights into selected technological trends and to enhance understanding of their implications for hybrid warfare/conflict COI S&D is publishing a series of HYFUTEC Technology Papers under the umbrella of Hybrid CoE Working Papers. HYFUTEC Technology Paper No. 2 concentrates on Quantum Sciences as a game-changing paradigm and disruptive innovation in Hybrid Warfare.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 6: Artificial Intelligence – A Key Enabler of Hybrid Warfare

Technological trends suggest that the portfolio of hybrid hazards will rapidly expand. With their disruptive potential, they open up new avenues for violence, as well as for the use of force in a hybrid warfare/conflict environment. New technologies have a catalytic effect on hybrid methods and tools. They improve the starting conditions for hybrid action, expand the arsenal of hybrid players and thus help to increase the reach of their activities as well as their prospects of success. Today, new technologies provide a way to achieve political goals in the grey area of various interfaces, such as between war and peace. Hybrid aggressors, but also NATO, EU and their member states can expect vast and diverse operational benefits from AI.

With this in mind, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and its Community of Interest for Strategy and Defence (COI S&D) have initiated the Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies (HYFUTEC) project, aimed at assessing and enhancing understanding of the disruptive potential of new technologies in the context of hybrid warfare/conflict. Within its broad future & technology horizon scanning, the project has identified 19 technological trends with urgent and profound implications in the context of hybrid scenarios.

In order to provide insights into selected technological trends and to enhance understanding of their implications for hybrid warfare/conflict COI S&D is publishing a series of HYFUTEC Technology Papers under the umbrella of Hybrid CoE Working Papers. HYFUTEC Technology Paper No. 1 concentrates on Artificial Intelligence as a catalyst and key enabler of hybrid warfare.”

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 5: HANDBOOK ON MARITIME HYBRID THREATS — 10 Scenarios and Legal Scans

The report illustrates how public international law, and specifically the international law of the sea, can be harnessed as a tool for detrimental security measures at sea. By juxtaposing the rights contained in the inter­national maritime law, the malicious hybrid actor has the opportunity to create a confusing and challenging situation, in which the target may have the utmost difficulty, and the larger international community as well, in forming an accurate situational awareness and making the necessary decisions on proper counter responses in a timely fashion. During the past few years, the world has already witnessed several such activities, highlighting how preparedness at all levels needs to be improved to meet, counter and recover from such situations.

At worst, malicious security measures at sea may lead to significant damage. A minor but deadly military measure, provoked or not, may trigger International Armed Conflict to enter into force, which would allow one state to apply such measures as confiscations, controls and even blockades. In a hybrid conflict, these kinds of measures would enable one state to put a stranglehold on the shipping to and from another state. 

When a hybrid conflict emerges at sea, it is recommended that mitigation and proactive multinational measures be launched at the earliest possible convenience. This may prevent controversial situations from escalating into serious conflict, or worse. There should be low tolerance for infringements and a low threshold for initiating consultations with EU/NATO/United Nations. A unified, multinational response and/or presence at an early stage is likely to lower the risk of facing more serious impacts. Here, attribution (technical and political) plays a key role in defining countermeasures and as a tool of deterrence. 

The search for solutions at a multilateral level and common ways to better identify vulnerabilities in the maritime domain should continue in order to make such vulnerabilities fewer and weaker and to increase the overall resilience of the operational environment. For its part, this Handbook is intended to contribute to this work.

Maritime
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 34: Uncrewed maritime vessels: Shaping naval power in hybrid threat operations

Hybrid warfare
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 33: State, non-state or chimera? The rise and fall of the Wagner Group and recommendations for countering Russia’s employment of complex proxy networks

Nordic-Baltic region
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 32: Russia’s hybrid threat tactics against the Baltic Sea region: From disinformation to sabotage

Resilience
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 31: Building Resilience to hybrid threats: Best practices in the Nordics

Arctic region
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 30: Security and geopolitics in the Arctic: The increase of hybrid threat activities in the Norwegian High North

Disinformation
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 29: Cause for concern: The continuing success and impact of Kremlin disinformation campaigns

Eastern Partnership countries
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 28: Moldova’s struggle against Russia’s hybrid threats: from countering the energy leverage to becoming more sovereign overall

Russia
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 27: Use and abuse of international law: Russian military training and exercises in its foreign relations

Russia
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 26: Humour in online information warfare: Case study on Russia’s war on Ukraine

China
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 25: Chinese economic coercion in Southeast Asia: Balancing carrots and sticks

Arctic region
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 24: Vulnerabilities and hybrid threats in the Canadian Arctic: Resilience as defence

Eastern Partnership countries
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 23: The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions

Resilience
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 22: Watching out for populism: Authoritarian logics as a vulnerability to hybrid threat activity

Aviation & Space
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 21: The space domain and the Russo-Ukrainian war: Actors, tools, and impact

Economic security
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 20: Chinese economic influence as a potential security threat: The Dutch response

Lawfare
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 19: EEZ-adjacent distant-water fishing as a global security challenge: An international law perspective