For the Netherlands, one of China’s largest economic partners in the EU, the main vulnerability stemming from economic interaction with China is that it can lead to strategic dependencies. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper analyzes China’s economic influence as a potential threat to national security and the Dutch government’s response. The main conclusion is that the degree to which vulnerabilities that stem from Chinese economic influence are acceptable depends on the potential damage and on the possible gains that the cooperation with China can bring for Dutch economic competitiveness.
Hybrid CoE Working Paper 19: EEZ-adjacent distant-water fishing as a global security challenge: An international law perspective
by Millicent McCreath, Valentin Schatz
International law provides the framework that determines rights and responsibilities in fishing, but there are still some gaps that are exploitable by malicious actors that have instrumentalized so-called Distant-Water Fishing (DWF). A fishing fleet from one country or more can be engaged in exhaustive and quite often illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activity on the high seas adjacent to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of another coastal state, which can be characterized as hybrid threat activity. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper uses the tensions between China and Latin American coastal states to analyze the security challenges posed by DWF from the perspective of international fisheries law.
Working Paper
Cyberattacks against industrial operations and the technologies used to monitor and control physical processes that provide vital services represent a significant escalation in the level of severity of modern conflict. There is, however, an unmet challenge in protecting industrial control systems (ICS) that support critical infrastructure against cyber threats. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper illuminates the role of ICSs in critical infrastructure, demonstrates the vulnerabilities of industrial operations to cyber incidents, and presents ways to develop more effective policies.
Working Paper
Three basic factors can be seen as guiding Russian policy choices both internally and externally: internal structural disunity, risk-taking, and Russia’s restless soul. These factors are connected to Russian hybrid threat activities, and they show that Russia is a rational actor, but its rationality is not as understandable from the Western perspective. In this Hybrid CoE Working Paper, these factors are analyzed, taking into consideration that they will inform future scenarios as well as explain Russian actions.
Working Paper
As finance and geopolitical competition have become increasingly intertwined, Western policymakers and strategists need to consider how financial markets, institutions, and players relate to hybrid conflict. China and Russia are often seen to actively use economic and financial means to further their strategic objectives. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper explores Chinese and Russian ideas and approaches to ‘financial warfare’, and discusses how the struggle for control over finance may prove to be shaping the geopolitical context.
Working Paper
Hybrid CoE Working Paper 15: The relevance of Clausewitzian theory in hybrid war: The Iranian-Saudi rivalry
by Arthur de Liedekerke, Maarten Toelen
Although 21st-century conflict might be different from the traditional theatres of war, the fundamental nature of human and political confrontation has not undergone such dramatic alteration. Hence, policymakers and scholars should embrace – rather than disavow – the lessons of the past and should not cast aside the Clausewitzian theory of war. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper looks at the Saudi-Iranian relationship in the light of the Clausewitzian theory and demonstrates its contemporary relevance.
Working Paper
Hybrid CoE Working Paper 14: Migration instrumentalization: A taxonomy for an efficient response
by Alia Fakhry, András Rácz, Roderick Parkes
Migration instrumentalization (MI) ranks as a low-cost strategy for perpetrators, as migrants can be exploited by countries that have few other strategic advantages. Hence, the EU must ask itself how it can raise the costs for its antagonists. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper proposes a taxonomy of MI events to help identify patterns in the way that migration is being instrumentalized. Then, the taxonomy is tested against four recent MI campaigns, and in a third step, the question of how the EU could use such a taxonomy is analyzed.
Working Paper
The Russian military build-up along the Ukrainian borders is being accompanied by an information offensive. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper analyzes that offensive and its evolution in the second half of 2021. The paper looks at public statements by high-level representatives of the Russian government, considers whether there is an increase in Russian information activities targeting Ukraine, and analyzes the narratives of these information activities. According to the analysis, the messaging of the highest Kremlin representatives and of the Russian “media” seems to run in unison and there seems to be some level of organization in the current communication campaign.
Working Paper
The EU’s Strategic Compass, to be finalized in 2022, should clarify the EU’s assessment of the security environment, define the level of ambition in security and defence, and offer tools to achieve that level of ambition. As the threat picture is more complex than before, a new approach is needed. This Hybrid CoE Working Paper explicates such an approach by looking at the development of the EU’s security and defence dimension and analyzing the threat environment and the concept of hybrid threats; introducing the concept of deterrence in the EU strategies; and looking at ways of improving the EU’s responses.
Working Paper
Hybrid CoE Working Paper 11: Disinformation 2.0: Trends for 2021 and beyond
by Isabella Garcia-Camargo, Samantha Bradshaw
Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election drew attention to the ways that social media can be leveraged for information operations by nation-state actors. Since then, however, these campaigns have evolved. Using the 2020 election in the United States as a case study, this Hybrid CoE Working Paper evaluates how the actors, strategies, and tactics for spreading disinformation have evolved from 2016 to 2020, and discusses the direction that future policymaking should take to address contemporary trends in information operations.