Hybrid CoE Working Paper 4: Hybrid Threats and Vulnerabilities of Modern Critical Infrastructure – Weapons of Mass Disturbance (WMDi)?

The working paper takes stock of critical Infrastructure-related lessons identified and learned during a two-year assessment done by the Community of Interest for Vulnerabilities and Resilience in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Modern critical Infrastructure seemingly serves as an effective instrument in the hands of adversaries able and willing to use hybrid tools. No widespread use of this possibility has thus far been tested in any serious conflict between developed states. The first time will quite likely surprise many.

Reference is made to modern critical Infrastructure Risk theory, which is connected to escala­tion theory of International conflicts. According to the main finding, a hybrid adversary may gain signif­icant benefits in conflicts by acting against critical Infrastructure in countries that are dependent on an open market economy and a transparent democratic decision-making process. Distraction and disruption describe the extreme tones of such an effect. Available asymmetric techniques such as cyber tools, covert special operations, information operations, political agitation and economic instruments, when combined with the vulnerabilities of modern critical Infrastructure, form a new threat. It is suggested that this threat be named “Weapons of Mass Disturbance (WMDi)”.

Resilience, attribution and exchange of information remain key words when improving defences against such potential activity.

Relevant critical Infrastructure is mainly owned by companies, not public services. The way forward must be planned together between states and the private sector. Community-level responses (EU, NATO) would be desirable in terms of regulation as well as preparedness.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 3: Building Resilience: Hybrid’s Weakness?

The fluidity of ‘Hybrid Threats’ makes them hard to theoretically grasp, and practically counter. This Working Paper encourages security practitioners to draw on insights from established work on resilience and civil preparedness. Resilience ensures that households, communities, societies, infrastructure and states are able to withstand and recover from shocks. Building resilience is an important part of the answer to hybrid threats, with its objective of normality juxtaposed to the chaos in which such threats thrive. The paper is written by Roger Clarke, Baltic Resilience Advisor, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK Government, and Dr Owen Jackson, Assistant Director – International Resilience, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Cabinet Office, UK Government.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 2: From Nudge to Novichok: The response to the Skripal nerve agent attack holds lessons for countering hybrid threats

The attempted murder of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia using a military grade nerve agent known as Novichok is an extreme manifestation of an “active measure” of a type for which the Russian state has been responsible in the past. The combination of the known Russian association with the development of the Novichok nerve agent, Russia’s likely motive to punish those the Russian state regards as traitors, and the fact that the poisoning of a former FSB defector using radioactive Polonium 210 had previously been carried out in the UK in 2006 led not only the British government but the US and other NATO allies and EU member states to declare publicly that there is no alternative conclusion other than that the Russian State was culpable for the attempted murder of the Skripals and for using an internationally banned nerve agent to do so, writes Sir David Omand, Visiting Professor at King’s College London.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 1: Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts

Hybrid CoE working paper to EU-NATO workshop, which served as feed in to NATO’s on-going Baltic Sea process and EU’s work on preparing a hybrid risk survey. The Paper was prepared to serve as food for thought for the workshop and is now published with key takeaways from the workshop.

Maritime
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 34: Uncrewed maritime vessels: Shaping naval power in hybrid threat operations

Hybrid warfare
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 33: State, non-state or chimera? The rise and fall of the Wagner Group and recommendations for countering Russia’s employment of complex proxy networks

Nordic-Baltic region
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 32: Russia’s hybrid threat tactics against the Baltic Sea region: From disinformation to sabotage

Resilience
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 31: Building Resilience to hybrid threats: Best practices in the Nordics

Arctic region
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 30: Security and geopolitics in the Arctic: The increase of hybrid threat activities in the Norwegian High North

Disinformation
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 29: Cause for concern: The continuing success and impact of Kremlin disinformation campaigns

Eastern Partnership countries
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 28: Moldova’s struggle against Russia’s hybrid threats: from countering the energy leverage to becoming more sovereign overall

Russia
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 27: Use and abuse of international law: Russian military training and exercises in its foreign relations

Russia
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 26: Humour in online information warfare: Case study on Russia’s war on Ukraine

China
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 25: Chinese economic coercion in Southeast Asia: Balancing carrots and sticks

Arctic region
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 24: Vulnerabilities and hybrid threats in the Canadian Arctic: Resilience as defence

Eastern Partnership countries
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 23: The Russian hybrid threat toolbox in Moldova: economic, political and social dimensions

Resilience
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Hybrid CoE Working Paper 22: Watching out for populism: Authoritarian logics as a vulnerability to hybrid threat activity

Aviation & Space
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 21: The space domain and the Russo-Ukrainian war: Actors, tools, and impact

Economic security
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 20: Chinese economic influence as a potential security threat: The Dutch response

Lawfare
Hybrid CoE Working Paper

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 19: EEZ-adjacent distant-water fishing as a global security challenge: An international law perspective