Hybrid CoE Paper 4: The Navalny poisoning case through the hybrid warfare lens

Viewing the poisoning of Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny with a Novichoknerve agent through the prism of hybrid war suggests that the methods and mindset of hybrid war are now possibly infecting Russian domestic politics. In this Hybrid CoE Paper Mark Galeotti brings forth that there must be a constant awareness that the Kremlin will see Wes­tern responses to the Navalny poisoning as foreign ‘hybrid war’ and will respond in kind.

Likewise, the more the West defends Navalny, the more the Kremlin will use that as ‘proof’ he is nothing less than an agent of subversion. This is not a reason to do nothing. Rather, any planning of measures to influence Russia should be ensured to takes place in parallel with consideration as to how to deter or minimise any reaction. The logic of hybrid war, after all, is that every move – real or perceived – has to have a counter-move.

The paper helps explain the stridency of Moscow’s reaction to Western criticisms, as well as its nature and it provides insights into how the West can respond, and the inevitable backlash that will follow.

Hybrid CoE Paper 1: Countering disinformation: News media and legal resilience

Media freedom and journalistic news media as an institution are the first targets when hostile actors try to undermine democracy and freedom of speech. In addition to journalists, the work of authorities, government officials, and researchers is also hampered. Today, independent and fact-based news reporting is in danger, and the existence of the journalistic media is threatened, not only by authoritarian governments but also by other hostile actors (domestic and foreign). Journalists and media organizations are under attack, for example by hate speech, disinformation, deep fakes, and doxing, in order to disrupt journalistic processes and sabotage media companies’ operations. Furthermore, the media sector has faced economic challenges due to global digitalization, which has changed the sector’s revenue model and media consumption.

A major issue is the legal status of the content-sharing platforms of global social media companies (henceforth social media platforms), as well as the transparency of the algorithms they use. As present-day gatekeepers of the daily news agenda, social media platforms control public discourse and political information and curate the content delivered by using non-transparent algorithms. Due to the tighter regulation of the journalistic news media, competition and operational conditions are not equal between the news media and social media platforms.

Journalistic news media as an institution has a key role in supporting democratic processes by maintaining reliable information and open public debate, and by enhancing public awareness of key societal issues and political decisions affecting societies and citizens. As trustworthy information is a vital commodity, citizens’ access to credible information must be secured in all circumstances.

Although the EU has put a great deal of effort into fighting against disinformation, it has not utilized the capacity of the journalistic media in tackling fakes, for example by providing financial or other resources to strengthen the media resilience.

Information resilience and the resilience of the journalistic news media are an essential part of the overall resilience of society. Hence, the EU as an institution and all member states are now invited to take part in improving regulation in order to help defend freedom of expression and liberal democracy.

On 24–25 April 2019, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) together with the Finnish Media Pool (part of the Finnish Emergency Supply Organization) hosted a News Media and Legal Resilience workshop. The April 2019 workshop recommends that the EU considers actions to:

  1. Define the legal status of social media platforms.
  2. Improve the transparency of algorithms operated by social media platforms.
  3. Explore whether harmonization of regulation could strengthen freedom of expression in the EU member states.
  4. Support EU member states to use more effective existing legal tools to tackle hostile activities against the media, and provide law enforcement.
  5. Provide financial support, either via the EU or member states, for the news media’s selfregulation, guaranteeing at the same time the integrity of the media’s self-regulative organizations.

Support EU member states in setting up a national legal fund providing professional journalists with insurance covering possible legal costs incurred by hostile actions against journalists.

Hybrid CoE Paper 2: DETERRENCE – Proposing a more strategic approach to countering hybrid threats

The playbook introduces a basic understanding of how deterrence is applied to counter hybrid threats. “Hybrid threats can affect our economies, critical infrastructure and influence the views of our society. That’s why we also need a broad range of deterrent measures, not only military means,” says Vytautas Keršanskas, a project leader at the Hybrid CoE.

Hostile actors must be denied the space to operate.  This requires a strategy of denial through increased resilience and imposition of costs to shape the perception of the adversary. The playbook is built practically to help the states develop their deterrence posture. It aims to inspire users to consider different options based on their own government’s capabilities and assets,” adds Kersanskas.

The playbook is based on the insights collected from security practitioners from Hybrid CoE participating states, the EU and NATO. Also, private sector companies and researchers were active partners during the one-year long project.

Hybrid CoE Paper 3: Tackling the bureaucratic vulnerability: an A to Z for practitioners

When it comes to tackling hybrid threats or other complex challenges, all states and organisations share the same challenge– their own bureaucratic vulnerability.

Symptoms of this vulnerability include the inability to work effectively across government departments and units, poor information flow, competition for resources and influence, and incoherent public messaging.

As hybrid threats comprise the use of multiple tools, vectors and activities in coordination (with malign intent), they challenge the coherence and cohesion of bureaucracies, exploiting blind spots and targeting vulnerabilities. The origins of such bureaucratic vulnerability lie in the range of ministries in which different states choose to place the hybrid threat file.

Based on cooperation with Hybrid CoE participating states, the EU and NATO over the last three years (including on elections, deterrence and situational awareness), the COI Hybrid Influencing proposes following A to Z of tools, tips and principles for overcoming bureaucratic vulnerability.

Identity & cognitive vulnerabilities
Hybrid CoE Paper 24

Social identities and democratic vulnerabilities: Learning from examples of targeted disinformation

Non-state actors
Hybrid CoE Paper 23

Countering state-sponsored proxies: Designing a robust policy

Aviation & Space
Hybrid CoE Paper 22

Cross-cutting technologies in Chinese space activities: Raising the risk of hybrid threats

Aviation & Space
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 21: China and space: How space technologies boost China’s intelligence capabilities as part of hybrid threats

Russia
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 20: Ukraine’s position in Russia’s strategic thinking: Domestic, regional and international order

Cyber
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 19: Legal power play in cyberspace: Authoritarian and democratic perspectives and the role of international law

Arctic region
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 18: The Arctic after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: The increased risk of conflict and hybrid threats

Instrumentalized migration
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 17: Instrumentalized migration and the Belarus crisis: Strategies of legal coercion

Maritime
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 16: Handbook on maritime hybrid threats: 15 scenarios and legal scans

Cyber
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 15: Exploiting cyberspace: International legal challenges and the new tropes, techniques and tactics in the Russo-Ukraine War

Cyber
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 14: AI-based technologies in hybrid conflict: The future of influence operations

Cyber
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 13: Digitalization and hybrid threats: Assessing the vulnerabilities for European security

Deterrence
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 12: Deterring hybrid threats: Towards a fifth wave of deterrence theory and practice

Cyber
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 11: Cyber threat actors: how to build resilience to counter them

Cyber
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 10: Cyber conflict in a hybrid threat environment: Death by a thousand cuts

Economic security
Hybrid CoE Paper

Hybrid CoE Paper 9: Towards a more China-centred global economy? Implications for Chinese power in the age of hybrid threats