Social identities and democratic vulnerabilities: Learning from examples of targeted disinformation

The exploitation of identity politics, amplified by today’s interconnected information environment, has become a powerful weapon against inclusive democracy. This Hybrid CoE Paper discusses the intersection of social identities and hybrid threats, presenting case studies from Germany, France, Sweden and beyond to illustrate how hybrid threat actors manipulate ethnic, religious, gender and socioeconomic identities. The paper highlights how false narratives spread rapidly, challenging authorities and exposing underlying grievances, such as prevailing inequality and structural injustice, which weaken societal trust. To mitigate these threats, the paper suggests that states should promote long-term cohesion by ensuring equitable access to the democratic system and by building intersocietal trust between communities and democratic institutions.

Protecting maritime infrastructure from hybrid threats: legal options

As incidents in the Baltic Sea demonstrate, protecting submarine communication cables is vital. This Hybrid CoE Research Report examines the legal options available to states for countering hybrid threats against maritime infrastructure. The report shows that while international law provides a range of options for states to maintain situational awareness of hybrid threats, it is much more limited in the operational area, where significant gaps remain. The report concludes by recommending several steps to strengthen the ability of states to legally protect their critical maritime infrastructure.

Countering state-sponsored proxies: Designing a robust policy

Hybrid threat attacks using non-state actors (NSAs) as proxies are growing in number and intensity. This Hybrid CoE Paper examines how states should approach the development of strategies to counter these attacks, which seek to destabilize European democracies and undermine the rules-based international order. To design functional policy solutions, the paper applies previous work on deterrence developed by Hybrid CoE to the problem of state-sponsored NSAs. 

Strings attached: China’s narrative influence in Sub-Saharan Africa

Drawing on extensive research conducted by Hybrid CoE between 2021 and 2024 in close cooperation with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, this Hybrid CoE Research Report meticulously maps the extent of China’s narrative influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. It analyzes China’s policy of “narrative warfare” against Euro-Atlantic interests in Africa and how this is pursued through the co-optation of local elites, the creation of economic dependencies, and control of media and technology infrastructure, among other means. The authors highlight how these activities contribute to the undermining of democratic processes and the proliferation of anti-Western sentiments in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Cross-cutting technologies in Chinese space activities: Raising the risk of hybrid threats

China’s use of AI and quantum technologies in its space capabilities increases its potential for coercive and aggressive operations. This Hybrid CoE Paper addresses China’s use of such cross-cutting technologies as part of hybrid threats in space, and emanating from space. The Paper also examines the implications for NATO and EU member states in the event of hybrid threats to their space capabilities.

Hybrid CoE Paper 21: China and space: How space technologies boost China’s intelligence capabilities as part of hybrid threats

Over the last decade, the People’s Republic of China has emerged as a strategic competitor to the EU and NATO, presenting a systemic challenge to the existing international order. This rebalancing of power is acutely felt in the space domain, where China has invested heavily. This Hybrid CoE Paper looks at China’s rapidly expanding space-based capabilities and their potential for misuse in hybrid threat operations. It examines the role of space in Chinese strategy, while also providing readers with a basic understanding of Chinese intelligence-gathering capabilities. It concludes by considering the implications of these developments for the EU and NATO. 

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 34: Uncrewed maritime vessels: Shaping naval power in hybrid threat operations

As uncrewed maritime vessels and the technology supporting them advance, they will play an increasingly important role in hybrid threat operations and in ways to counter them. This Working Paper analyzes the current and potential impact of uncrewed vessels in the context of hybrid threats. It first reviews the history of uncrewed surface and undersea vessels, followed by a description of how these technologies can be employed in hybrid threat operations, illustrated through a case study of a hybrid threat scenario in the Baltic Sea. Finally, the paper assesses Chinese, Russian and Iranian state-of-the-art uncrewed maritime vessel capabilities.

Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 35: Lessons learned from Western sanctions on Russia: Knowing your target well

In response to the illegal war against Ukraine, the West has imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, with mixed results. This Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis critically assesses the West’s sanctions strategy with a view to improving its design and impact. The Analysis then presents seven crucial lessons learned that can enhance the efficiency of sanctions regimes.

Hybrid CoE Paper 20: Ukraine’s position in Russia’s strategic thinking: Domestic, regional and international order

This Hybrid CoE Working Paper examines Ukraine’s role in Russia’s strategic thinking. Based on a careful analysis of Putin’s speeches and Russia’s strategic documents, the paper deciphers the logic behind the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine and describes several future scenarios that Russia has envisaged for the country. The result is a valuable resource that helps policymakers and experts better understand Russia’s overarching strategy towards Ukraine and the West, as well as its hybrid threat operations and tactics. Based on these insights, the paper formulates key recommendations to guide Western policies in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 33: State, non-state or chimera? The rise and fall of the Wagner Group and recommendations for countering Russia’s employment of complex proxy networks

This Hybrid CoE Working Paper summarizes the rise and fall of the Wagner Group, detailing its emergence and transformation from a non-state into a state actor, and discussing a range of countermeasures that can be applied against such organizations. The main conclusion is that groups like Wagner need to be conceptualized and dealt with as non-hierarchical, decentralized, and dynamic organized crime or terrorist networks, requiring simultaneous and synchronized targeting at all levels of the organization.