The emergence of cyberspace has raised questions about the application of international law, potentially requiring the reinterpretation of existing rules or drafting new conventions. While this legal reassessment may vary from state to state, there are blocs of like-minded states – authoritarian and democratic – that take opposing positions, often reflecting their vital interests. This Hybrid CoE Paper argues that states’ conflicting legal opinions regarding the application of international law to cyberspace should therefore not only be assessed in the context of legal interpretations, but also understood as the deliberate deployment of legal power play by states as an instrument of power.
This Hybrid CoE Paper looks at how Russia’s military aggression in Europe has increased the importance of the Arctic – especially the European High North – on the international security agenda. In the Arctic, the potential for conflict escalation relates to hybrid threat operations.
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This Hybrid CoE Paper presents a legal assessment of the instrumentalization of migration by the Government of Belarus against the EU and its Member States in 2021. The paper demonstrates that legal dynamics were at the heart of the incident, enabling Belarus to leverage the flow of migrants to achieve coercive effects. The Belarus migration crisis offers important lessons about responding to similar incidents in the future and illustrates how hostile actors exploit legal asymmetries and vulnerabilities to their strategic advantage.
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Hybrid CoE Paper 16: Handbook on maritime hybrid threats: 15 scenarios and legal scans
by Georgios Giannoulis (ed.)
Disruptions to shipping and other malicious maritime activities may have immediate and/or long-term effects leading to serious economic and political consequences. This Hybrid CoE handbook establishes a taxonomy of 15 maritime hybrid threat scenarios, each of which is followed by a short legal analysis. The handbook aims at supporting the Participating States, the EU and NATO by helping them to inform policymakers and maritime operators, such as naval and coast guard officers, about the legal context of possible maritime hybrid operations; and providing a structure for policy and concept development, operational planning, exercises, and setting technical requirements.
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine saw new actors and novel activities exploiting cyberspace: Numerous non-state actors, hacker groups and commercial enterprises have entered the virtual battlespace without necessarily being belligerent entities. While states were already struggling with how to regulate activities in cyberspace, the new tropes, techniques and tactics have increased legal uncertainty. Intentionally exploiting these variances, in turn, will create legal asymmetry. Therefore, NATO and the EU could benefit from aligning their legal interpretations of international law applicable to cyberspace.
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Emerging information technologies, especially AI-based ones, could initiate a new major evolution in military influence operations. With the possibility to generate fake individuals, fake videos and a false consensus over an issue, hybrid warfare may enter a new era. Moreover, lower ranked military powers and non-state actors could benefit from increasingly easier access to these technologies. This Hybrid CoE Paper explores the changing landscape of influence operations and concludes that NATO, the EU and European countries need to update the doctrine and process for influence and counter-influence operations using the information domain; develop internal capabilities to detect and counter deepfakes; and train dedicated staff.
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From artificial intelligence to quantum computing, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) may be part of the next revolution in military affairs – but it is not clear how EDTs will shape the future of conflict or strategies aimed at countering hybrid threats. This Hybrid CoE Paper seeks to uncover what kind of role EDTs could play in European security. It does so by contextualizing the emergence of EDTs in the broader process of digitalization.
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Combining modern tools of statecraft, hybrid threats undermine the foundations of deterrence – capability, credibility and communication. This Hybrid CoE Paper develops several insights and principles to help restore these foundations and offers a framework for applying deterrence principles to deter hybrid threats. The paper also points to a potential fifth wave of deterrence theory and practice. Future tools of deterrence will be wielded less by the military and government and more by the whole of society, woven into the fabric of everyday life.
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Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past two years amid the coronavirus pandemic. This Hybrid CoE Paper describes the way in which the pandemic has amplified cyber threats and looks at state and non-state actors’ incentives for cyberattacks (financial gain, espionage, political interference, harmful attacks against critical infrastructure). The paper concludes by suggesting response measures that could be taken by NATO and the EU, as well as by national governments in building cyber resilience.
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The likely future scenario for cyber defence is countering attacks similar to those that have occurred between 2010 and 2020, but with a greater number of events and increasingly complex exploits. This positions cyberattacks and cybercrimes as the most prominent part of a future hybrid threat campaign and could elevate cyber security as the most significant national security challenge to be faced. This Hybrid CoE Paper puts nation-state-sponsored cyber warfare actions into perspective as compared to cyber actions used for espionage or cybercrime and argues how both national security policy and cyber security practices should change to counter looming cyber defence challenges.