During Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the information domain was targeted with war propaganda and disinformation. In Lithuania, Russian disinformation became recognized as a pressing national security threat, and countering disinformation became a key priority in dealing with hybrid threats. This Hybrid CoE Paper describes the context and objectives of Russian disinformation against/in Lithuania, and presents the main actions taken by the government, civil society, and private sector to counter the threat since 2014. The analysis shows that countermeasures were divided between denial (including resilience-building) and the imposition of costs. This approach helped to decrease the spread, severity, and impact of Russian disinformation.
Hybrid CoE Paper 6: Deterring disinformation? Lessons from Lithuania’s countermeasures since 2014
by Vytautas Keršanskas
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