What if these campaigns, which seem to be increasingly integrated into strategies of interference and power waged by external actors, were actually able to distort the election results and therefore violate the sovereignty of states? – asks Marine Guillaume, Digital Ambassador Deputy at the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs and Lecturer at the… Read more
States with a strong and long-term interest in influencing, manipulating and creating events in other countries to promote their interests will probably utilize different non-state actors in a systematic manner. Directing activity through non-state entities presents an opportunity to conduct activities of a harmful nature against other countries covertly. Acting covertly through a third entity might even… Read more
“The November 25 naval skirmish between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Kerch Strait highlighted the fraught legal status of the strait and the Azov Sea, a status that Russia has been exploiting in recent months to exert political and economic pressure on Ukraine” writes Dmitry Gorenburg, a Senior Research Scientist in the Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs… Read more
“Whereas resilience is a necessary building block in creating a coherent strategy towards Russia, it is nevertheless insufficient when it comes to deterring Russia from unwanted ads”, writes Heine Sørensen and Dorthe Bach Nyemann from the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College.
Besides the attribution challenges posed by covert influence actions, there is a need to develop effective frameworks for assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of overt and covert persuasive communications employed in the hybrid threat security environment, writes Rubén Arcos, lecturer in communication sciences at Rey Juan Carlos University in Madrid.
The prospect of a settlement between Athens and Skopje and further expansion of the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the prospect of the EU embarking on membership talks with yet another local country, undercuts Russian influence in the Balkans, writes Dr. Dimitar Bechev, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
Cyberspace, and particularly election technology, has become a new domain for those who wish to suppress or interfere with the key processes of democratic societies in order to further their own ends, writes Liisa Past, Next Generation Leader at the McCain Institute for International Leadership and former Chief Research Officer at the Cyber Security Branch… Read more
Deterrence in cyberspace is possible, but it requires an effort to develop a new domain-specific framework. Conventional deterrence does not work in cyberspace, as it does not address the global reach, anonymity, distributed and interconnected nature of this domain, writes Dr. Mariarosaria Taddeo, Research Fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford.
Hybrid threats are designed to blur the distinction between peace and war, as well as complicate and fall below the target’s detection and response thresholds. The wicked problems created by hybrid threats require new solutions for early warning. – writes Patrick Cullen, Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
Russia’s Intelligence Services (RIS) are a key instrument in the country’s toolbox of hostile influence exerted abroad. As such, they are no mere ad hoc arrangement by some spy chief, nor a paranoid delusion of the West, but rather an integral function in accordance with Russian legislation and based on a long tradition. Indeed, their… Read more